Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Objects of thought, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. When several speakers refer on their inner object there is the problem of whether it is the same or not. For example, do they have the same wish?
See also relation-theory, truthmakers, mentalism, reification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
G. E. M. Anscombe on Objects of Thought - Dictionary of Arguments
Prior I 125 Object of thought/intentionality/e.g. unicorn/AnscombeVsTradition: object of thoughts, not particulars. - "The Greeks worshiped Zeus": true sentence, needs no object, not even "x thinks __". >Individuals, >Objects, >Truth, >Reference. Existence/non-existence can not make a difference for the analysis of the sentence - but I think of Churchill and not of an idea (Brentano ditto). >Existence, >Non-existence. As an object of belief a man does not need to have a certain size. - Not any description of the object of belief must be true. >Possibilia. E.g. a tribe revered a piece of wood. Object: God, not wood. - False: "They worship nothing". - Correct: "That which they worship, is nothing." - >de re, >de dicto._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
||
> Counter arguments against Anscombe
> Counter arguments in relation to Objects of Thought
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28